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This Working Paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Corporate 
Governance. Abstract 
Recent work in both the theory of the firm and of corporate law has called into 
question the appropriateness of analysing corporate law as ‘merely’ a set of 
standard form contracts. This article develops these ideas by focusing on 
property law’s role in underpinning corporate enterprise. Rights to control assets 
are a significant mechanism of governance in the firm. Practical circumstances 
dictate that such rights must be shared. Property law protects the rights of co-
owners against each other’s opportunistic attempts to grant entitlements to third 
parties. At the same time, it uses a range of strategies to minimise the costs such 
protection imposes on third parties. The choice of strategy significantly affects 
co-owners’ freedom to customise their control-sharing arrangements. This 
theory is applied to give an account of the ‘proprietary foundations’ of corporate 
law, which has significant implications for the way in which the subject’s 
functions are understood and evaluated. 
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1 Introduction 
For more than twenty years, corporate law scholarship has been dominated—
whether as first step or point of departure—by an economic model that views 
firms as complex sets of contracts.
1  For those who subscribe to it, a widely 
perceived implication is that corporate law, being the body of rules which 
governs these complex contracts, is essentially a specialist branch of contract 
law. Consequently, the ‘contractarian’ theory of corporate law adopted key ideas 
from the law and economics of contracts.
2   
 
This contractarian view of corporate law has had many critics.
3 A large number 
have been from perspectives external to the economic analysis of law. Some 
found the theory’s dismissal of the significance of corporate personality to be 
unconvincing.
4 Others objected to the normative emphasis given to economic 
efficiency by those deploying the theory,
5 and arguments based upon it for the 
significance of ‘shareholder value’.
6 
 
Clearly, the economic theory of the firm does not provide a complete ontology 
of the corporation, whether the inquiry limits itself to legal discourse or is posed 
at a more general social level. Yet the economic theory of the firm has never 
sought to be anything other than instrumental. It attempts only to predict 
patterns of organisation and finance as responses to particular states of the 
world, and if successful, offers a way of understanding when and why firms 
come into existence. For corporate lawyers applying this theory, the goal is to 
understand how particular patterns of corporate law may affect these processes, 
so as to inform debate about how best it might achieve regulatory or facilitative 
goals.   
 
For scholars seeking to understand the functions performed by corporate law, the 
contractarian theory has proved a useful workhorse.
7 However, even within this 
tradition, the limits of the ‘contractarian’ approach are now coming to be 
realised. Viewing corporate law merely as a set of ‘standard forms’ for business 
organisation yields the counter-intuitive implication that its significance for 
business may be trivial.
8 Commercial actors are perfectly capable of producing 
standard forms themselves and there seems no clear reason for thinking that, 
apart from in relation to the smallest firms, the state has a clear comparative 
advantage in supplying such terms. Yet comparative studies appear to 
demonstrate empirically the significance of corporate law for the functioning of 
capital markets.
9 Something appears to be missing. 
   2
Moreover, economic theory has moved on from viewing firms simply as 
contracts to understanding them as combinations of contracts and productive 
assets, emphasising the significance of the allocation of property rights to those 
assets for the governance of the enterprise.
10 More recently, a few scholars—
most notably Hansmann and Kraakmann—have claimed that corporate law 
performs functions that go beyond simply supplying standard terms, suggesting 
that its more significant role is to partition property rights to assets used in 
productive enterprise.
11 However, to date there has been no attempt to link the 
new economic theory of the firm to the theory of corporate law. This article is a 
first step towards filling that gap.  
 
We demonstrate the significance of property law’s role in structuring 
arrangements whereby parties share ownership of productive assets. Property 
law protects the entitlements of co-owners against opportunistic attempts by one 
of them to grant entitlements to third parties that undermine the other co-
owners’ claims. It does so by making their entitlements to the assets generally 
enforceable. Hence it affects an open-ended set of potential third parties who 
might deal with the firm. Hansmann and Kraakman’s insight, with which we 
concur, is that this role could not be replicated by private contract.
12 However, 
their account of the ways in which property law assists corporate law is limited 
solely to what they term ‘affirmative asset partitioning’.
13 We contend that the 
scope of property law’s contribution to corporate law is more general, involving 
aspects of agency, trusts, secured credit, fraudulent conveyance and corporate 
insolvency law. We also show that property law must necessarily perform two 
functions—not simply protecting the entitlements of co-owners, but also 
minimising the costs imposed on third parties by this protection. In so doing, it 
employs three basic strategies, the mixture of which we describe and evaluate in 
relation to corporate law. The analysis yields important implications both for our 
understanding of what corporate law does, and for our thinking about how it 
should be structured.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with an overview of the 
contractarian view of corporate law scholarship and its limitations. Next, we 
explain how the theory of the firm has moved beyond this to emphasise the 
importance of property rights. This in turn leads to a general discussion of the 
way in which property law facilitates the sharing of ownership, and the 
strategies it employs to minimise the total costs involved. To make the analysis 
more concrete, we apply it to the corpus of corporate law. The final section 
concludes by explaining the implications of the analysis. 
   3
2 The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law and its Limitations  
As corporate law facilitates and regulates business firms, an account of its 
functions must be premised upon a theory that explains what a firm is and why it 
exists. These questions, first posed by Ronald Coase in 1937,
14 form the research 
agenda of the economic theory of the firm. Thus the theory of the firm is the 
starting point for functional accounts of corporate law.  
 
Coase’s answers focused on the costs of contracting. Parties involved in a firm 
interact with one another over long periods of time. The costs of producing 
many iterated spot contracts, or of one long-term contract covering all relevant 
contingencies, would be very high. Instead, it might be cheaper to grant 
authority to one party to make decisions about what should be done. For Coase, 
then, a ‘firm’ was characterised by an authority relation. 
 
The Contractarian Theory of the Firm 
In 1972, Alchian and Demsetz argued that Coase’s notion of authority was 
misplaced.
15 In their view, firms were no more than contracts.
16  Whilst there 
were costs to writing the contracts which constituted the firm, these were only 
quantitatively, rather than qualitatively, different from those involved in writing 
long-term contracts between firms. The firm, then, was a special case of long-
term contract. The second question shifted from ‘why firms?’ to ‘why this type 
of contract?’ 
 
This shift in emphasis had been accompanied by developments in the economic 
theory of ‘contracts’ (intertemporal exchange). The new theory focused on the 
effects of ‘asymmetric information’ between contracting parties: both about 
their respective attributes before they entered into the relation, and about the 
quality of their performance (or the reasons for their non-performance) once the 
relation had been established. Under these circumstances, it would of course be 
very costly to ‘police’ performance, and hence parties would have an incentive 
to appropriate to themselves some of the gains from trade or to underinvest 
effort. Thus the theory of ‘agency’ contracts investigated how payments based 
on observable variables could be structured so as to give the party with the 
superior information an incentive not to shirk. Alchian and Demsetz put these 
problems at the core of their analysis of the firm.
17  Shortly afterwards, Jensen 
and Meckling offered a positive theory of corporate finance based on the same 
premises.
18  Together, these accounts offered a plausible answer to the question, 
‘why this type of contract’? 
   4
Contractarian Corporate law   
In what must have seemed a natural step, a generation of legal scholars applied 
this contractarian theory of the firm to corporate law: if firms were (complex) 
contracts, then corporate law was a (complex) branch of contract law.  
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, law and economics scholars understood the 
role of contract law as filling ‘gaps’, which parties left in contracts because of 
the costs of negotiation and drafting, by supplying ‘default’ or ‘boilerplate’ 
terms. Drawing an analogy with standard form contracts, it was argued that such 
‘default rules’ should be chosen according to what a majority of contracting 
parties ‘would have wanted’—had they been able to specify their terms at zero 
cost.
19 In effect, this viewed the default rules set out by the law as a form of 
public good.
20  A related claim was that ‘mandatory rules’—those which parties 
were unable to disapply by contract—were justifiable only by the presence of 
market failures.
21  Easterbrook and Fischel’s famous series of articles on 
corporate law coupled these ideas drawn from the early law and economics 
analysis of contract law with the insights of the agency costs theory of the firm, 
arguing that the principal function of corporate law was to supply default rules 
into the ‘corporate contract’.
22 
 
The Limitations of Contractarian Corporate law 
In recent years, a number of internal weaknesses have become apparent in the 
‘contractarian’ theory of corporate law.
23 Subsequent developments in contract 
economics suggest that the function of legal ‘default rules’ may be much more 
limited than the contractarians imagined.
24  
 
First, it is now understood that the costs of drafting are not the only reason why 
parties might leave ‘gaps’ in their contracts.
25  Another is the cost of 
enforcement.
26 Where relevant information about performance is costly to 
‘verify’ to a court, parties may prefer to rely on non-legal governance 
mechanisms to resolve the problem.
27  For a court to ‘fill gaps’ in such 
circumstances would be counter-productive.  
 
Secondly, even if it is possible to identify ‘gaps’ generated solely by drafting 
costs, there is pessimism about whether legal ‘default rules’ really offer 
significant savings, save for the smallest enterprises. The potential economies of 
scale seem limited, given the wide variation in users’ requirements,
28 and even 
where they exist, it is plausible that they could equally be captured by ‘standard 
forms’ developed by professionals working in a particular field.
29  There is no 
reason to think that almost all corporate terms could not be supplied in this 
fashion. The history of the development of the joint stock partnership in England 
prior to the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 is a case in point,
30 another   5
being the standard documentation used in modern bond issues.
31   These 
weaknesses leave the contractarian theory offering at best a limited explanation 
of corporate law’s function.  
 
3 Property and the Firm 
The Property Rights Theory of the Firm 
It is ironic that while corporate lawyers were applying the contractarian theory, 
economists were already moving on. Williamson and others influenced by 
organisational theory developed a more ‘Coasean’ account of the firm, 
emphasising qualitative differences from market exchange.
32 They saw firms as 
a response to the ‘hold-up’ costs arising from squabbles over the distribution of 
productive surplus,
33 giving rise to transaction costs of productive activity over 
and above the ubiquitous costs of asymmetric information.
34  
 
Of course, such hold-up problems may be ameliorated by contracts. However, a 
contractual solution will be ‘incomplete’ in the presence of uncertainty and 
asymmetric information. A promise to pay a fixed amount will mean the 
promisor must bear the risk that the production process fails, for whatever 
reason, to produce the expected surplus. A contingent promise will mean the 
promisee must be able to observe and verify to a court that failure to make the 
promised payments does not fall within the contractual exclusions.  
 
Williamson argued that where the amounts at stake were large, it would be 
cheaper for one party simply to buy both assets and organise production itself, 
thereby avoiding the hold-up problem.
35 These insights were formalised by 
Oliver Hart and his co-authors, giving rise to what has become known as the 
‘property rights’ theory of the firm.
36 A key result is the ability to explain the 
boundaries of the firm: that is, when an asset will be owned as part of a co-
specialised collection (within the firm), and when held separately with the 
governance of the relation between the two parties determined by contract 
(outside the firm).  
 
The theory also seeks to explain various patterns of corporate finance, most 
notably the use of debt.
37 The intuition here is that an entrepreneur seeking debt 
finance enters into a deal with the financing creditor that gives the creditor the 
power to take over the ownership of the assets should the entrepreneur default 
on the repayments. Thus, provided that the assets are worth more to the 
entrepreneur than the value of the outstanding repayments, this allocation of 
property rights elicits repayment without a court needing to determine anything 
other than whether or not default occurred. As such, it is an ‘end-game’ 
mechanism: a step that is only taken if the relationship between creditor and   6
debtor is on the verge of breaking down. Its existence in the background, 
however, makes the debtor want to continue to keep the relationship on foot.
38  
 
In the ‘property rights’ framework, the firm is therefore characterised as a 
collection of people and assets, with ownership of the latter carefully allocated 
amongst the former. The implications of this account for the theory of corporate 
law have not yet been fully developed.
39 At first blush, it seems to imply a 
simple recharacterisation of the contractarian theory: instead of being a simply 
nexus of contracts, the firm is now a nexus of contracts about assets.
40 Whilst it 
can be argued that the terms of such contracts might differ from the ‘pure’ 
contractarian account,
41 this does not escape from the objections to the 
contractarian account. However, such a recharacterisation entirely overlooks an 
important function of property law where ownership is shared. To see this, it is 
necessary to examine more closely what is understood by ‘property’.  
 
Undivided Ownership 
The account of ‘property rights’ employed in the theory of the firm is 
reductionist, in keeping with economists’ quest for analytic parsimony.
42 
‘Ownership’ is defined as the entitlement to exercise ‘residual rights of control’. 
‘Control’ is significant because where contracts are incomplete, the power to 
direct how an asset is used ex post will make a difference to outcomes.
43 
‘Residual’ implies that the rights to control cover all states of the world which 
are not specified by law or contract ex ante.
44 Residuarity matters because it is 
still possible to allocate residual rights even if specific directions about what 
should (not) be done in particular circumstances cannot be written or enforced.  
 
The residuary essence of property rights is a point well understood by analytic 
lawyers. The classic explication is that of Honoré, describing the content of the 
package of legal entitlements known as ‘ownership’: 
 
Ownership comprises the right to possess, the right to use, the right to 
manage, the right to the income of the thing, the right to the capital, the 
right to security, the rights or incidents of transmissibility and absence of 




Honoré emphasises that subject to restrictions imposed by law or contract, the 
‘owner’ is the party who holds all the other rights which a person may enjoy as 
regards an asset. Thus the owner is at liberty to dictate the use, management, and 
alienation of the asset, and to use it to bond the performance of his contracts 
(what Honoré terms the ‘incident of liability to execution’). Where undivided   7
ownership is enjoyed by one person, the economists’ accounts therefore have 
much in common with lawyers’ understandings. 
 
The Demand for Shared Ownership  
However, in all but the simplest business firm, it is necessary to share the rights 
of residual control, because of constraints of time, wealth, and administrative 
costs. 
 
Where the firm’s physical assets consist of more than a relatively small 
portfolio, an entrepreneur will lack the time to make all the control decisions 
herself.
46 Hence she will need to delegate responsibility for certain ‘use 
decisions’ about the assets to an agent. This might involve simply giving the 
agent power to enter into contracts on behalf of the firm. In this case, she 
delegates the power to make the firm’s assets liable to execution by 
counterparties to relevant contracts entered into by the agent. A more 
comprehensive delegation might give the agent power to use, buy and sell assets 
on the firm’s behalf. In each case, the aspects of ownership rights which were 
not delegated to the agent would remain with the entrepreneur, and she alone 
would retain the right to make these types of control decisions in respect of the 
assets. This will require a ‘second-order’ arrangement about the allocation of 
ownership entitlements, specifying which is exercisable by whom.  Furthermore, 
the entrepreneur will wish to retain an option to terminate the delegation and 
retake entire control of the asset should the agent underperform, and may wish 
to include restrictions on the manner in which the agent may exercise the 
delegated entitlements—namely, for her benefit rather than the agent’s own 
benefit. 
 
Where it is otherwise efficient for an entrepreneur to own an asset, she may be 
unable to do so because she is wealth-constrained. The obvious answer is to 
obtain outside finance.
47 Where contracts are incomplete, financiers will wish to 
make use of property rights as a mechanism of governance. Hence the parties 
will again wish to share ownership. This could be done in a variety of ways. If 
the financier is himself an entrepreneur with appropriate expertise, the assets 
could be owned jointly. This too will require a ‘second-order’ arrangement about 
the circumstances in which the ownership entitlements may be exercised. A 
simple mechanism would be to require the unanimous consent of each proprietor 
to exercise ownership rights. However, as the number of participants increases, 
the costs of information-gathering, communication and negotiation about what 
to do (collectively, ‘the costs of decision-making’) rise exponentially. In many 
cases, a unanimity rule would be replaced by other decisional rules, such as 
majority or qualified majority voting.
48 These too have costs, and it is not 
difficult to see that beyond a few co-owners, it may make sense to delegate the   8
day-to-day management of the asset to an agent, or one of the co-owners, and to 
reserve for the co-owners collectively the right to remove (by unanimity, 




Alternatively, ownership rights might be shared sequentially. In this case, the 
entrepreneur retains control unless some verifiable contingency occurs — such 
as failure to repay an instalment — whereupon the financiers take control. This, 
again, will require a ‘second-order’ arrangement detailing circumstances under 
which control will change, and any restrictions on the manner  in which the 
entrepreneur may exercise her entitlements in states of the world in which she 
has control.  
 
To summarise, practical constraints dictate that the entitlements of undivided 
ownership in relation to productive assets must be shared between several co-
owners. This necessitates some variety of ‘second-order’ arrangement 
describing the way in which the entitlements are shared, the content of which 
will respond to the nature of the economic determinants of sharing.  
 
The Costs of Shared Ownership 
Sharing the entitlements of ownership, however, gives rise to a particular type of 
agency cost: namely that one co-owner may exercise control in a manner 
inconsistent with the ‘second-order’ arrangement, which benefits herself at her 
colleagues’ expense. This might be termed a joint-owner agency (‘JOA’) 
problem.
50 Regarding many of the entitlements of ownership, this is simply a 
standard agency problem, a solution to which can be incorporated in the 
‘second-order’ arrangement. The most effective solution will often rely on the 
property rights themselves: that is, punishing such opportunism by terminating 
the opportunist’s shared ownership.
51   
 
However, the JOA problem becomes more acute in relation to those parts of the 
entitlements of ownership which give the owner power to transfer entitlements 
to third parties. For example, a co-owner may alienate an asset for a 
consideration that maximises his private utility, but not the utility of the co-
owners as a whole. Or he may render the assets liable to execution for the non-
performance of a contract that does not benefit the co-owners as a whole, simply 
to secure some personal benefit.  
 
What is especially pernicious about JOA problems involving alienation and 
contracting (as opposed simply to ‘use-decisions’) is that they systematically 
undermine the other co-owner’s ultimate ‘threat’ of terminating the 
opportunist’s co-ownership. An opportunistic grant of entitlements to a third   9
party can simultaneously reduce the other co-owners’ ability to exercise control 
rights whilst netting the opportunist a private benefit of greater value than the 
share he might stand to lose.  
 
The Property Law Solution 
Where one co-owner alienates a shared asset to himself in a manner inconsistent 
with the ‘second-order’ arrangement about the sharing of ownership 
entitlements, then enforcement is a straightforward matter. The rights of the 
other ‘owners’ can be asserted against the agent simply because he has promised 
not to do this. However, if the co-owner has general personal creditors, then a 
contractual remedy solely against him would offer only limited protection. The 
agent’s general personal creditors might become entitled to execute against the 
asset once the agent had transacted with the firm. If the other owners did not act 
quickly, they might find that it was too late.  
 
This conflict between claims of the other owners and those of third parties is 
even starker in situations where the agent has purported to alienate the asset, or 
to enter into a contract with a third party on the non-performance of which the 
asset is to be rendered liable to execution. In each case, if the entitlement of the 
other ‘owners’ may be displaced by those of third parties, then the JOA 
problems discussed above make the sharing of ownership—and thereby the 
organisation of firms—considerably more costly.  
 
However, there is a legal route by which this aspect of the JOA problem can be 
ameliorated. As the rules by which property is transferred are themselves aspects 
of the legal system, it is open to lawmakers to provide that the terms of co-
owners’ second-order arrangements about the division of control will be 
privileged over the putative entitlements granted to third parties. Or, in other 
words, to extend the enforcement of the second-order arrangement about shared 
control to third parties.   
 
Shared Ownership 
Functionally, therefore, we are comparing ‘enforcement against X’ and 
‘enforcement against a general set of third parties’. This invokes a second 
dimension of the analytic lawyer’s conception of ‘property rights’, that of scope. 
Traditional accounts of this categorisation employ the Roman distinction 
between rights in rem and rights in personam: proprietary and personal rights. 
The former are (depending on the particular conception) said to inhere in an 
asset, or to be ‘good against the world’. The latter, on the other hand, inhere in 
or are good against only particular persons. Thus, simply to say that the content 
of A’s entitlement in relation to an asset is entirely residual does not make A the 
‘owner’ if the entitlement is only valid against B. For A’s entitlements to be   10
capable of being classed as ‘proprietary’, they must be capable of being asserted 
against an open-ended set of persons.  
 
The distinction between the content of legal relations and their scope comes out 
most clearly in the analysis of Wesley Hohfeld. Hohfeld’s account of the legal 
‘elements’ — the fundamental building-blocks from which all legal relations 
may be created — gives a familiar set of analytical tools for examining the 
content of legal relations.
52 In his terminology, ownership contains a package of 
privileges (liberties), coupled with rights to prevent others from interfering with 
the exercise of these privileges.  Correlatively, non-owners have no-rights to the 
particular varieties of enjoyment to which the owner is entitled, and duties not to 
interfere with the owner’s exercise thereof. Honoré’s description of the content 
of ‘ownership’ can be understood in Hohfeldian terms as the largest ‘bundle of 




Hohfeld’s commitment to a dyadic conception of legal relations meant that he 
rejected the idea that rights in rem ‘inhere in’ an asset, or even that they 
comprise a single relation between the right-holder and an indefinite number of 
persons. Rather, he conceived of them as being multiple bilateral relations 
running in parallel between one owner and many non-owners. He termed such 
relations multital, and contrasted them with relations existing only between two 
persons, which he termed paucital.
54 Hohfeld’s analytic technology is superior 
to the Roman dualism, because it allows for the uncoupling of the contents of 
the packages of entitlements referred to as ‘property rights’ from their scope. 
Many lawyers tend to think of the contents of these packages as fixed by the 
law—the so-called ‘numerus clausus’ of permissible interests.  
Hohfeld’s approach allows us to see that there is no necessary analytic link 
between the fact that entitlements are multital—that is, have the general scope 
that is characteristic of property rights—and the particular content of those 
entitlements. As such, it describes more readily the flexibility of Equity’s 
recognition of proprietary rights, for which the contents of the entitlements may 
be customised by private agreement between co-owners.
55 This is a point to 
which we shall have cause to return in due course. Hohfeld’s terminology has 
not passed into the general consciousness of lawyers. In the discussion that 
follows, we therefore for familiarity refer simply to ‘personal’ and ‘proprietary’ 
rights, drawing upon Hohfeld’s analysis only where it is necessary to do so.
56  
 
Economic theorists do not explicitly discuss the scope of proprietary 
entitlements, or how these are to be distinguished from personal entitlements. 
Instead, they appear simply to assume that the enjoyment of ‘owners’ is 
protected from interference by non-owners.
57 This would not matter if there   11
were only one person who could be classed as ‘owner’ of the firm’s assets: their 
residuary entitlement-set (as described by Honoré) could be asserted against all 
non-owners. However, where ownership is shared, property law also has a role 
to play in protecting owners against each other. 
 
Understanding the scope of property rights allows a meaningful distinction to be 
drawn between contracts about ownership and genuinely shared ownership. The 
effect of granting ‘proprietary’ status to a ‘second-order’ arrangement sharing 
entitlements of ownership between A and P is that P’s monitoring costs are 
greatly reduced. If P’s entitlements have full proprietary status, then A simply 
cannot alienate the asset to a third party without P’s consent. The only other way 
to make the arrangements enforceable against third parties would be for the co-
owners to make all potential third parties promise that they would not enter into 
transactions with any of the co-owners in respect of the co-owned assets that 
would be injurious to the other co-owners’ entitlements. This would be 
prohibitively costly. Thus property law rules perform a function in relation to 
the organisation of business enterprise that is far more significant in practice 
than that of the ‘default rules’ supplied by law into agreements between 
participants in these enterprises. Although this function of property law has been 
overlooked in the economic theory of the firm, it is clearly complementary to the 
account given by that theory. Indeed, it provides a missing link between that 
theory’s insights and the theory of corporate law. 
 
Minimising the Total Costs of Shared Ownership: Three Strategies of Property Law 
Reducing the monitoring costs of other shared owners does, however, come at 
the price of imposing costs on third parties. For every ‘unauthorised’ transaction 
where co-owners succeed in asserting their entitlements to an asset against a 
third party, that party may suffer a reliance loss of an equivalent or greater 
amount.  If the entitlements of co-owners are completely enforced in every case, 
then the sum of the costs imposed on third parties may exceed the savings in co-
owners’ monitoring costs. 
 
The legal system must therefore make a fundamental trade-off between reducing 
co-owners’ JOA costs and imposing externalities on third parties. There are also 
the procedural costs of administering the system.
58 All other things being equal, 
it would be desirable for the legal system to seek to minimise the total costs of 
shared ownership—that is, the sum of JOA costs, externalities and the costs of 
administering the system. Property and organisational law employ a mix of 
strategies, which are not mutually exclusive, to effect this fundamental trade-off. 
Each has comparative (dis)advantages in relation to some elements of the total 
cost function, and therefore the selection of the optimal mix of strategies will 
depend upon the context.    12
One basic strategy is simply to restrict the types of entitlement-sharing 
arrangement that may be agreed amongst co-owners to a closed list. This is the 
so-called ‘numerus clausus’ rule of Civilian legal systems.
59 In its simplest form, 
the criterion for enforcement of co-owners’ entitlements is whether they fall 
within the list: provided that they do, they always trump third parties, and vice 
versa. Such a rule seems cheap to administer. However, its effectiveness at 
reducing JOA costs and externalities depends crucially on the length of the list 
and the way in which the chosen arrangements are selected. As we have seen, 
shared ownership is used as a mechanism of governance by participants in 
firms,
60 and so co-owners will want as much flexibility as possible in designing 
structures appropriate for their needs. Third parties will on the other hand prefer 
a shorter list, so as to minimise their search costs. Commercial actors will rely 
on a set of customary indicators to help them identify the type of shared 
ownership (if any) in place.
61 As the list gets longer, the costs of such 
identification will probably grow exponentially. Thus the system will work best 
with a small list that is chosen carefully, so as to be of maximum utility to those 
seeking to share ownership.
62 Of course, to do this requires effectively, 
lawmakers designing the list must have access to an enormous amount of 
information—sufficient to be able to identify the relevant constituents and their 
cost functions.  
 
Another basic strategy may be termed selective enforcement. Simple law-and-
economics analysis suggests that the sum of JOA costs and the externalities 
created by property law would be minimised by a rule which allocated the risk 
of loss to the party who is able to avoid it most cheaply—namely P or the third 
party (TP).
63 Of course, it is unlikely to be possible to say a priori which of 
these parties is likely to be the ‘least-cost avoider.’ Whilst the costs to P of 
monitoring A’s actions are likely to depend on the nature and structure of the 
business, the costs to TP of discovering whether or not the transaction is 
permitted under A’s bargain with P are likely to vary according to the 
circumstances of the particular transaction.
64  However, if at the time a claim for 
enforcement is brought (that is, ex post), a court can compare co-owners’ 
monitoring costs with the third parties’ search costs, then the ‘least-cost avoider’ 
principle can be directly applied by giving effect to co-owners’ entitlements 
only if they have the higher costs.  
 
The classic examples of legal rules that can be understood as performing a 
function of this type are the common law doctrine of apparent authority and the 
bona fide purchaser rule in equity.
65 The former holds a principal liable on an 
unauthorised contract where it reasonably appeared to the third party that the 
agent in fact had authority to enter into the transaction on the principal’s 
behalf.
66 The latter allows a party with an equitable interest in an asset to have   13
their claim defeated by a third party who purchases the asset for value from a 
fiduciary in circumstances under which the third party reasonably believed that 
the fiduciary was entitled to sell. The rules are functionally equivalent: for the 
application of either it is necessary to consider the context of the transaction in 
question, and whether it was of such a nature as to make it unreasonable for the 
third party so to rely.
67  
 
A selective enforcement strategy means that there is no need for the attributes of 
shared ownership arrangements to be fixed by law. Thus co-owners are free to 
structure the terms on which they will share entitlements as best suits their 
needs—witness the flexibility, for example, of trusts.
68 However, this flexibility 
for co-owners may necessitate greater administration costs than the numerus 
clausus strategy, for courts must engage in fact-intensive enquiries as to parties’ 
relative knowledge. Yet the back-and-forth interplay between commercial 
practice and legal standards engendered by tests couched in terms of 
‘reasonableness’ means that the administration costs are probably much lower 
than they at first appear. 
 
A third strategy is to institutionalise some sort of procedure for disseminating 
information about sharing arrangements used—for example a central register—
thereby lowering search costs.
69 Many interests in property are registered, and 
registers often keep information not only about the existence of interests, but 
also about their contours.
70 This allows a registration system to maintain 
flexibility for co-owners. The costs of administration and costs for third parties 
will depend in part on the technology available for dissemination of registered 
information—the more costly it is to become informed, the greater the 
externalities.  
 
Property Law and the Theory of the Firm 
To recapitulate: recent developments in the theory of the firm, whilst identifying 
the significance of allocations of control rights, have failed to explain the role 
played by property law in facilitating the sharing or partitioning of control 
between different participants in a firm. An understanding of the significance of 
the scope of proprietary rights—their ‘in rem’ character—points the way to a 
more complete explanation of the role played by law in supporting business 
enterprise. In particular, only property law can provide automatic enforcement 
of the ‘second-order’ allocations of entitlement to residual control in relation to 
assets used in productive enterprise. Moreover, the way in which the costs to 
third parties are minimised will have a significant impact on the degree of 
flexibility enjoyed by participants in the firm to structure their ‘second-order’ 
arrangements so as to respond most appropriately to their particular needs. The 
claim of this section is therefore that a fuller understanding of the functional   14
significance of property law can at once enrich the economic theory of the firm 




There may appear to be an inconsistency between the way in which this account 
describes the demand for and the supply of property law rules. As regards 
demand, the theory of the firm shows that allocation of control rights can be a 
powerful governance mechanism in circumstances where the transaction costs of 
contracts are very high—in particular, the costs of verifying to a court 
information relevant to the enforcement of a complex contract. Yet regarding 
supply, it has been argued that minimising total costs of property law rules will 
often require courts to become involved in complex, fact-contingent enquiries. 
Does this mean that the role ascribed for law in protecting shared property is 
inconsistent with the role ascribed to property rights as a mechanism of 
governance in the absence of court enforcement?
72 
 
This inconsistency is merely apparent. It must be borne in mind that the strong 
assumptions made about parties’ inability to verify information to courts in 
some of the formal ‘property rights’ models are exaggerations. Their results are 
best interpreted as demonstrating simply that in many circumstances it will be 
cheaper for parties to govern the division of quasi-rents within the firm by 
allocating residual control rights than to do so by a complex contract that relies 
upon court enforcement. Thus for internal governance matters, the allocation of 
control rights have significant consequences. Yet this can only be supported by 
the existence of a body of rules that govern JOA costs, which the ‘residual 
control rights’ mechanism is necessarily unable to do. Under these 
circumstances, external enforcement is the only available mechanism. 
 
4 The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law 
Shared Ownership and Corporate Assets 
What can the foregoing analysis tell us about the structure and operation of 
corporate enterprise? As a starting point, it may be helpful to explain how the 
ownership of assets used in productive enterprise can be thought about as shared 
between individuals associated with a firm. That is to say, how the contents of 
the bundle entitlements that together comprise ‘ownership’ are parcelled out 
amongst participants. The way in which this is done in a typical public company 
involves a combination of various techniques, each used in less complex forms 
of business organisation. It is useful quickly to describe some of these first, for 
they form conceptual building blocks. In each case, there is a need for what we 
earlier termed a ‘second order’ arrangement between the participants, specifying 
which of the entitlements of ownership are exercisable by whom and when they 
are so exercisable.   15
The simplest business organisation, namely agency, involves only delegation of 
ownership entitlements in relation to assets by the principal to his agent. Those 
entitlements not so delegated of course remain the principal’s. Where two 
principals combine their firms to form a partnership, this involves joint sharing, 
between the partners, of the entitlements of ownership in relation to the business 
assets. Although some entitlements will be exercised jointly—that is, 
collectively by the partners—most partnerships will combine this with some 
delegation amongst the partners of responsibility for particular types of control 
decision. The delegated entitlements will be exercised by the delegate alone, in 
contrast to those which remain subject to the collective decision-making of the 
partners.  
 
Now consider debt finance. If an entrepreneur (or a partnership, or indeed a 
company) borrows money to fund her business, this can be understood as a 
sequential sharing of entitlements between the creditor and the entrepreneur. 
That is, the entitlements are exercisable by the entrepreneur so long as she 
continues to make repayments.
73 Where there is more than one creditor, there 
may be joint sharing of the (contingent) entitlements between the creditors. That 
is, should the entrepreneur default on her debts generally, then the entitlements 
become exercisable by the creditors collectively.
74 
 
A typical public company can be seen as involving a particularly complex 
sharing arrangement, combining elements of each of the above. There is 
sequential sharing between shareholders and creditors, and delegation from 
shareholders to managers.
75 There will also be joint sharing between 
shareholders of the aspects of ownership that are not delegated to managers: 
namely residual returns and the right to remove the delegates.
76  This 
combination of sharing arrangements is portrayed in Figure 1.   16
















What is the law’s role in facilitating such sharing of ownership entitlements in 
companies? To understand this, it is helpful to return to the distinction between 
the content and the scope of legal entitlements.
77  The law performs two basic 
functions. First, it assists participants in delineating the contents of their 
entitlement-sharing arrangements—that is, the ‘second order’ arrangements 
about the division of the entitlements of ownership in relation to the business 
assets. These arrangements are essentially voluntary agreements between the 
participants, and the law’s role here is that cast for it by the contractarian theory: 
to supply ‘standard forms’ which participants may employ. Secondly—and more 
importantly—the law provides mechanisms whereby the scope of the parcels of 
entitlements given to each participant is made, to use Hohfeld’s term, ‘multital’. 
That is, their entitlements are protected not just against other participants to the 
voluntary arrangement, but against persons generally. In short, the arrangements 
are given proprietary effect. 
 
A Taxonomy of the Law Relating to Companies 
To show how the law performs these two functions, we must engage in an 
exercise in taxonomy. This briefly maps the structure of corporate law in a way 
that distinguishes those aspects that perform the second role, which we term the 
‘proprietary foundations’, from those that perform the first, which we term the 
‘contractarian superstructure’.
78 The discussion is organised by considering in 
turn the various dimensions of the asset-sharing arrangements in typical 
companies, as unbundled in the previous section. As is now well known, 
functionalist accounts of corporate law suggest that the contractarian rules in 
each case respond to agency costs—the costs of conflicts of interest—generated 
between the various categories of participant.
79 Less celebrated, however, is that 
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each aspect depends upon foundations from property law. Table 2 summarises 
what follows. 
 
Table 2: The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law 
Relevant Aspects of Law 
Functional problem  Entitlement 
sharing   Contractarian Proprietary 
Shareholder-
shareholder conflicts  Joint 
Art 70, law of meetings, class 
rights,  
s 459, derivative action, 
shareholder agreements 
Director-shareholder 
conflicts  Delegation  Directors’ duties, s 303, 
shareholder decision rights 
Ostensible authority, ss 
35-35B, bona fide 




conflicts  Sequential  (Limited liability), share capital, 





conflicts  Joint Subordination  agreements 
 
Corporate insolvency 
law, preference law 
 
 
(i) Shareholder-shareholder and director-shareholder conflicts. If there were no 
board of directors, then the shareholders would be empowered together to 
exercise the entitlements of ownership in relation to corporate assets. They 
would share these entitlements jointly—that is, the entitlements could only be 
exercised through some collective decision-making mechanism. A unanimity 
rule would be unwieldy because of the costs of making decisions, so instead 
company law provides a framework within which decisions may be made by 
majority vote.
80  Even this, however, may prove too costly for regular use, hence 
the allocation of jurisdiction to make business decisions to the board of 
directors.
81 To encourage the directors to exercise these powers for the benefit of 
the business, as opposed to their own benefit, there is a complex body of law 
concerning directors’ duties in the performance of their functions.
82 Moreover, 
power to make a number of important decisions, sufficiently significant to be 
worth incurring the costs of shareholder decision-making, is retained by 
shareholders. This includes of course the appointment and removal of the 
board.
83 Where the shareholders make decisions, there is potential for majorities 
to seek to expropriate minority claimants. Company law seeks to protect the 
interests of minorities through a range of mechanisms, most significantly the 
imposition of restrictions on the alterations of the constitution,
84 and the 
provision of remedies to minority shareholders for particularly serious harm 
caused by majority misbehaviour.
85    18
None of these aspects of the legal framework involves mechanisms of property 
law. They affect only participants internal to the corporate enterprise and are 
largely susceptible of modification by these parties.
86 Had ‘company law’ not 
existed, such rules could be replicated (or created) by private contracts between 
participants.
87 Thus the content of these rules are part of the ‘contractarian 
superstructure’ of corporate law. 
 
Nevertheless, property law does perform an important role in supporting the 
enforcement of these ‘contractual’ arrangements against third parties. This 
comes into play in situations where one of the parties—a director or 
shareholder—acts without authority under the constitution or in breach of their 
duties (where applicable), in a transaction involving a third party. That is, there 
is an attempted alienation or grant of entitlements in respect of corporate assets 
that is contrary to the ‘second-order’ arrangement about how these entitlements 
are to be shared. This would encompass not only attempts to sell the assets, but 
also attempts to use the assets to bond unauthorised contracts,
88 or attempts to 
allow newcomers to participate in the sharing of control of the assets—that is, 
unauthorised issues or transfers of shares, or appointment of directors. Formerly 
it also included, by virtue of the doctrine of ultra vires, purported transactions 
that exceeded the company’s objects clause.
89 
 
In each of the foregoing situations, an unauthorised transaction may be set aside 
against a third party. To provide for this result by contracts with all potential 
third parties would be prohibitively costly. The open-ended set of potentially 
affected parties gives away the proprietary nature of the rules in question. In 
corporate lawyers’ terms, the crucial rules are those of agency and trusts law. 
Thus unauthorised attempts to alienate corporate assets,
90 or to create contractual 
claims against them,
91 or to entitle newcomers to become shareholders
92 or 
directors,
93 may not bind the corporate assets or the existing parties to the 
corporate ‘bargain’.
94 Similarly, transactions in which directors breach their 
fiduciary duties may give rise to proprietary claims against directors and third 
parties by the company,
95 the law drawing an analogy with transactions by a 
trustee in breach of trust.
96  
 
A second basic function performed by property law that is necessary for shared 
ownership arrangements to function is that of overreaching.
97 Namely, 
providing that assets and claims exchanged by agents for assets from the shared 
pool—or claims against those assets—automatically become subject to the 
(shared) allocation of ownership entitlements, as opposed to becoming the 
property of the agent.
98 This is an equitable principle, the best-known 
application of which is in the law of trusts. In the corporate context, it is applied 
slightly differently, because the legal title to the property remains with the   19
company itself. Yet an overreaching mechanism is nevertheless in play. The 
default position is that an agent selling goods on behalf of his principal becomes 
merely a debtor for the price, whereas if the agent is also a trustee, then the 
money received becomes subject to the principal’s beneficial ownership.
99 A 
director is not strictly speaking a trustee, but is treated as though he were, thus 
funds received by him in return for the sale of corporate assets are treated as 
corporate property rather than his own. 
 
Hansmann and Kraakman have recently called attention to the significance of 
certain aspects of these proprietary foundations, which they term ‘affirmative 
asset partitioning’.
100 In essence, their label captures the notion that shareholders 
are unable to deal with corporate assets in an individual capacity. In particular, 
shareholders’ personal creditors may not execute against corporate assets, but 
rather are entitled only to the bundle of rights that comprise the shares held in 
the company. Yet this is merely one aspect of a more general function 
performed by property law, upon which corporate law is founded: namely, the 
giving of proprietary (‘multital’) effect to restrictions on unauthorised dealings 
by those sharing the entitlements of ownership of assets.  
 
(ii) Shareholder-creditor and creditor-creditor conflicts. The third source of 
potential conflict between participants in corporate enterprise is that between 
shareholders (or shareholders and managers together) and creditors. A basic 
feature of any lending arrangement is the contingent allocation of entitlements to 
control assets between the borrower and the lender.
101 This is true too of 
corporate borrowing arrangements. Should the company default on its debts, its 
creditors become entitled to control its assets. The principle of limited liability 
means, however, that it is only corporate assets that are so subject, and not the 
personal assets of shareholders or directors.
102 This limitation means that 
shareholders and directors may be tempted, particularly when the company is 
heading for insolvency, to strip assets, take high-risk gambles, or to increase 
indebtedness.
103 Such transactions, where effective, enable the shareholders to 
expropriate creditors. The law’s response to these problems involves a number 
of rules that restrict transactions that are likely to profit shareholders and/or 
directors at creditors’ expense. Best known of these are the regulation of share 
capital,
104 the prohibition on ‘wrongful trading’,
105 and the equation on 
insolvency of the ‘interests of the company’, which the directors are duty-bound 
to further, with the interests of creditors.
106  
 
However, both limited liability itself and the aforementioned restrictions on its 
abuse are best analysed as part of the ‘contractual superstructure’. It would be 
possible in each case to replicate them by contract.
107 Thus those contracting 
with outsiders on behalf of the company could insert a standard clause to limit   20
liability, as appears to have been done by insurance firms formed prior to the 
Limited Liability Act 1855.
108 Moreover, these contracts could also contain 
provisions whereby corporators promise not to engage in activities that will 
harm creditors, and agree to face personal liability should they do so.
109 
 
The proprietary foundations in relation to creditors are found in the law of 
secured credit and insolvency.
110  Secured credit allows a debtor to promise its 
creditor, with proprietary effect—that is, enforceable against third parties—(i) a 
certain priority ranking and (ii) that certain assets will not be alienated without 
its consent. Thus, a security interest prevents the debtor from alienating 
collateral without the secured creditor’s consent,
111 and, through the creditor’s 
priority in insolvency, ensures that subsequent borrowings will not dilute its 
claim.




A more general restriction is supplied by what was formerly known as 
‘fraudulent conveyance’ law, now termed ‘transactions at an undervalue’.
114 
This allows creditors to challenge eve-of-insolvency transactions that harm their 
interests, setting them aside against third parties generally. Whilst a prohibition 
on fraudulent conveyances may be understood as a term that any creditor would 
want written into a contract with their debtor,
115 its enforcement against third 
parties generally is not something that a contractual prohibition would be 
capable of achieving.
116 The law of fraudulent conveyances is therefore best 
seen as part of the proprietary foundation of corporate law.  
 
Finally, there are costs arising from conflicts between creditors. For most 
companies, these are potential rather than actual costs, because their impact is 
only felt when the company becomes insolvent. However, where this does 
happen, very significant costs can arise from the attempts of multiple creditors 
to exercise their entitlements simultaneously.
117 At this point, corporate 
insolvency law steps in to effect a collective transformation of creditors’ 
rights.
118 Once again, attempts to deal with the assets in ways that are 
inconsistent with these orderings will bind third parties.
119 English law provides 




Relevant Property Law Strategies  
The foregoing taxonomy allows us to identify the rules of property law that 
underpin corporate enterprise. These can now be usefully analysed by 
considering the various strategies they employ for minimising the sum of JOA 
costs and enforcement externalities. A version of the simplest and most 
restrictive strategy, numerus clausus, can be seen in operation at the level of   21
organisational form. Only a limited number of forms of business organisation 
are available, each of which has certain immediately recognisable and 
distinctive features that relate to the way in which the entitlements of ownership 
are shared. The registered company (whether limited by shares, guarantee, or 
unlimited) is just one of these—the others comprising agency, trusts, 
partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Partnerships.
121 
Similarly, the law of security interests is said to employ a numerus clausus of 
property law structures.
122 The idea is presumably that by limiting the size of the 
menu, an outer bound may be placed on the costs incurred by third parties in 
determining the likely allocations of entitlements.
123 However, the numerus 
clausus technique is only employed in a very loose sense in relation to 
organisational form, because participants retain a free hand to customise the 
terms of the entitlement sharing to organisational assets between themselves.
124 
Moreover, the law also permits parties to customise the terms of non-possessory 
security interests,
125 as well as facilitating the use of other devices that function 
as security even if they are not formally so classified.
126  This flexibility is 
facilitated by the complementary use of the two other techniques of property law 
for resolving the essential trade-off.  
 
The registration strategy is used heavily in company law, with varying degrees 
of success. In particular, the company’s constitutional documents, business 
address, and the names of its members and directors must all be registered.
127 
The memorandum and articles of association specify the outer boundaries of any 
corporate agent’s powers (the company’s objects), the division of these powers 
between different groups of agents and the procedures for decision-making 
about how these powers are to be exercised. Through registration, these 
documents are available to be consulted by third parties. A related requirement 
is that the company’s name must end in ‘Ltd’ or ‘plc’ and must be used in all 
correspondence, in order to inform third parties that they are dealing with a 
company rather than an individual.
128 Similarly, the register of charges gives 
details of most non-possessory security interests granted by the company.
129  
 
The registration strategy is complemented in company law by the use of 
selective enforcement. Where a third party is dealing with an individual agent, 
the scope of whose power is not set out in the company’s constitution, then the 
counterparty may nevertheless enforce the contract if the agent reasonably 
appeared, depending on the context, to have authority.
130 Similar rules govern 
transactions with third parties that are entered into by directors in breach of their 
fiduciary duties. These may leave the outsider liable either to have an executory 
contract set aside or to a proprietary claim by the organization for restitution of 
its property, unless the counterparty is in good faith and gives value.
131 The 
essence of both tests involves a determination of which party could have   22
avoided the transaction at lowest cost.
132 The same strategy can also be seen at 
work in relation to fraudulent conveyances. Although the current legislation 
contains no defence of bona fide purchaser, it does have a substantive 
requirement that the transaction be effected at an undervalue.
133 This is precisely 
the sort of circumstance that would put a third party ‘on notice’ under the old 
law and so in functional terms can be viewed as working in a similar manner.
134  
 
Particularly interesting is the complex interplay in company law between 
registration and selective enforcement. Early judicial responses to registration 
seem to have proceeded on the assumption that the register could be consulted 
easily. Thus the doctrine of ‘constructive notice’, articulated most clearly by the 
House of Lords in Ernest v Nicholls,
135 provides that third parties are deemed to 
be aware of the contents of all public documents available for consultation at 
Companies House. Similarly, short shrift was shown to unsecured creditors in 
Salomon v Salomon, who because of the use of the ‘Ltd’ suffix, knew that they 
were dealing with a company rather than an individual.
136 Unfortunately, it soon 
became clear that consulting the Register was in most cases prohibitively costly, 




Thus there developed a judicial gloss on the registration strategy. The ‘indoor 
management rule’ provides that where there is a procedural restriction in the 
constitution—that is a transaction requires some authorisation under the 
company’s constitution—an outsider, even if they know of the existence of the 
procedural hurdle, is entitled to assume that all necessary steps have been taken 
provided that nothing in the register indicates otherwise.
138 This is a remarkable 
piece of judicial casuistry. Taken at face value, the outsider is first deemed to 
know the entire contents of the public register, but then relieved from making 
enquiries about whether relevant steps have been taken provided that they would 
in the ordinary course of things have been done. The net result is that the 
outsider is given incentives to make enquiries to a standard that is remarkably 
similar to that employed under the ‘pure’ selective enforcement strategy—
namely, whether it was reasonable in all the circumstances for him to rely on the 
appearance of the transaction’s authenticity.
139 
 
The balance was shifted even further in favour of third parties by the First 
Company Law Directive,
140 implemented comprehensively by the Companies 
Act 1989. This abolished the effects of the doctrine of ultra vires for third 
parties, and in relation to agency, created a ‘safe harbour’ for third parties where 
a transaction is authorised by the board.
141 Yet even this is not entirely free of 
selective enforcement. Section 35A is limited in its protection to third parties ‘in 
good faith’, although it is for the company to show the absence of this state of   23
mind, and it requires more than what would suffice to show that a third party is 
‘on notice’ at common law.
142 Perhaps more significantly, the question of what 
constitutes ‘the board’ is left to general company law—with the result that a 
selective enforcement approach also seems to be in the process of development 
in relation to this question.
143 
 
Similarly, in the realm of secured credit, the interplay of registration and 
selective enforcement has led to a complex body of law. The registration 
strategy, fully introduced in relation to charges after the courts had had fifty 
years of experience in relation to companies’ constitutional documents,
144 has 
always been applied with sensitivity to its impact upon third party search costs. 
Thus registration of a charge acts as notice of its existence, but not of its 
contents.
145 Although on one view, the numerus clausus principle applies not 
only to the types of security interest that may be created, but also to their 
attributes,
146 the better view is that ‘customisation’ of equitable security interests 
is perfectly possible,
147 and that negative pledges and automatic crystallisation 
clauses take effect subject to selective enforcement—that is, they are only 
enforceable against third parties with notice of their existence.
148 
  
Evaluating the Mix of Strategies 
As we have seen, the primary contribution of property law to the functioning of 
corporate law has historically been through the mechanism of selective 
enforcement. Generally speaking, it is preferable to the numerus clausus strategy 
because of the greater flexibility it provides for insiders in structuring their 
sharing arrangements. This is borne out by its comprehensive use in corporate 
law. The effectiveness of the registration strategy depends largely upon the 
technology employed for disseminating registered particulars to outsiders. 
Where it is cheap for outsiders to become informed, registration is capable of 
acting as a superior alternative to selective enforcement. However, where this is 
not the case, it simply acts as a complement, providing a straightforward 
mechanism for conveying certain types of information and channelling the ‘due 
diligence’ questions that third parties are encouraged to make.  
 
Over time, the technology available to insiders seeking to monitor the actions of 
their delegates has become more effective, with the result that a shift can be 
discerned in favour of protecting third parties, most noticeably in the realm of 
corporate contracts. Yet the advent of the Internet means that the costs of 
consulting the Register have been dramatically reduced for most third parties.
149 
It seems likely that the overall costs of the system would perhaps be reduced by 
a corresponding shift to allocate greater responsibility to third parties.
150  
   24
Two Analytic Payoffs 
Before turning to normative considerations, it is worth examining two ways in 
which the foregoing argument has implications for the way in which we analyse 
corporate law.  
 
(i) The (Very Limited) Role of Corporate Personality. A reader who has been 
following the analysis will have noted that the discussion makes only passing 
reference to corporate personality. Indeed, the ‘building blocks’ of property law 
upon which corporate law is based would allow a structure that arranges shared 
entitlements to physical assets in a way very similar to that which occurs in 
companies, but without using the corporate form. What difference, then, does 
corporate personality make? To the functional analysis of control rights, the 
answer is ‘very little’.  
  
Start with a simple case. If ABCo Ltd is sole owner of its assets, has no 
outstanding debt and X (an individual) is the sole owner of the shares in ABCo, 
then what difference exists between the control that X may exercise over the 
assets of ABCo, and the control which X would be able to exercise were they his 
personal assets, and he had no outstanding debt? If attention is directed to a 
more complex case, where entitlements are shared, then it becomes clear that 
there are of course differences in the way in which the strategies of property law 
are applied to different organisational forms—thus, the rules relating to 
corporate transactions, secured credit and insolvency in particular are different if 
the corporate form is used. However, it is a non sequitur to assert that these 
differences flow from the fact that a company has legal personality. They flow 
from nothing more than the fact that the strategies of property law are applied 
differently to shared ownership organised in companies.
151 To emphasise this 
point, recall that under Scots law, a partnership has legal personality (whereas of 
course under English law it does not) yet no one suggests that because of this, 




To say that corporate personality plays no part in an account of corporate law’s 
function is not to say that the idea is a meaningless fiction. Rather, the role 
played by the notion of legal entity is a more subtle one. It affects not how the 
law  functions, but how lawyers think about the law. Arguably, ‘corporate 
personality’ provides a convenient shorthand for thinking about the combined 
effects of many of the foregoing property law mechanisms than would a system 
lacking such a notion. As such, it may act as a useful heuristic for judges and 
lawyers fleshing out the application of particular rules.
153 This is, however, a 
quite separate issue from how the law functions in relation to business 
enterprise.    25
(ii) The scope of ‘corporate law’. One of the clearest implications of the analysis 
concerns the scope of what we think about as ‘corporate law’. The subject tends 
to be seen as principally comprised of the rules described in the foregoing 
discussion as ‘contractarian’.
154 This is in part because rules of this type 
comprise the majority of the Companies legislation,
155 in part because the very 
size of the subject makes it necessary to draw essentially arbitrary distinctions 
when writing books or designing courses and in part because knowledge of other 
relevant areas of law tends to be assumed on the part of students and 
practitioners of the subject. There is nothing inherently wrong with subject 
boundaries being drawn for convenience, so long as the reason for so doing is 
not forgotten. Yet with ever-increasing specialisation in the teaching and 
practice of law, there is a risk that with such boundaries come barriers to 
understanding. As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, it is only through the 
existence of a wide range of rules that are commonly classified under other 
headings—property law, agency, trusts, secured credit, insolvency—that the 
‘core’ aspects of corporate law are able to do their work. Moreover, 
understanding and evaluating the way in which the law functions to facilitate 
and regulate the operation of business enterprise requires consideration of this 
whole range of doctrines. Our analysis suggests that the efficacy of the whole 
depends disproportionately upon the structure of the proprietary foundations, 
and in particular upon the way in which the essential strategies of property law 
are mixed together.   
 
5 Conclusion: Towards a Unified Theory of Corporate Law 
Contributions of the Analysis 
Economists seeking to explain the nature and scope of firms now attach as much 
significance to property rights as to contracts. In contrast, the regnant economic 
theory of corporate law is nevertheless still based upon a purely contractarian 
view of the firm. Taking seriously the importance of property rights requires 
corporate law theorists to understand the significance of property law’s 
functions—in particular the facilitation of sharing of ownership rights between 
individuals—in supporting governance arrangements in firms.  
 
A few scholars have already started to appreciate the significance of property 
law’s contribution to the functioning of corporate law. Most notably, Hansmann 
and Kraakman have identified the importance of the way in which property law 
partitions assets between co-owners. This article makes three contributions to 
this emerging programme of research into the ‘proprietary foundations’ of 
corporate law. First, a link is established between the theory of the firm and the 
role of property law. The ‘property rights’ theory of the firm emphasises how 
entitlements to control assets can be used as governance mechanisms that 
complement incomplete contracts. However, it relies upon a simplistic   26
conception of undivided ownership, which does not account adequately for the 
need, in all but the smallest business organisations, to have ‘second order’ 
arrangements that stipulate how the entitlements of ‘ownership’ in relation to 
assets are to be shared between participants. These sharing arrangements can 
themselves act as mechanisms of governance, and so it is valuable for parties to 
be able to customise them to suit their particular requirements, as by contract.  
 
Yet the very sharing of ownership itself creates joint-owner agency (‘JOA’) 
costs, arising from the possibility that a party with control for the time being 
might use it to grant entitlements in relation to the asset to a third party which 
are inconsistent with those of the other co-owners. If such transactions were 
effective, they (or the possibility thereof) could undermine the use of shared 
ownership as a governance mechanism. Property law solves this problem by 
making the sharing arrangements enforceable not only as between the co-owners 
(‘insiders’ to the firm) but as against third parties generally. It is this function 
that forms the link between property law and the theory of the firm. 
 
Property law’s protection of co-owners against each other’s opportunism can, 
however, generate externalities—costs for unwitting third parties who incur 
losses in reliance on putative transactions. The second contribution of the 
analysis is to show that property law’s function in relation to corporate 
enterprise is not simply to minimise JOA costs, but to minimise the sum of JOA 
costs, enforcement externalities, and the costs of administering the system. 
Three strategies are employed to effect this ‘essential trade-off’: (i) the use of a 
numerus clausus: that is, a  fixed list of possible sharing arrangements; (ii) 
selective enforcement—only against third parties who are ‘least-cost avoiders’; 
and (iii) mandatory registration of the existence or terms of such arrangements. 
A numerus clausus strategy severely limits the ability of co-owners to customise 
their arrangements, thus limiting their ability to reduce JOA costs. Both the 
selective enforcement and registration strategies are significant advances over 
this, for they allow co-owners to have contract-like flexibility over the terms of 
their sharing arrangements, whilst nevertheless giving these proprietary effect. 
The choice between registration and selective enforcement will depend 
primarily on the technology available for disseminating registered information 
to third parties. 
 
Thirdly, to make the theory concrete, the article identifies the rules of English 
law that form the ‘proprietary foundations’ of corporate law. These are, in brief, 
the rules of agency and trusts law that support the delegation of ownership 
entitlements and the overreaching of property entitlements; and the laws of 
secured credit, fraudulent conveyances and corporate insolvency that permit the 
sequential sharing of ownership entitlements between equity and debt claimants.   27
The range of rules thereby included is, we consider, significantly broader than 
the notion of ‘affirmative asset partitioning’ developed by Hansmann and 
Kraakman. The basic strategies employed by these aspects of property law are a 
combination of a numerus clausus principle (for organisational forms and 
insolvency law) and selective enforcement (for agency transactions, equitable 
property rights, and fraudulent conveyances). Superimposed upon these in the 
context of corporate law is a set of registration requirements, and much of the 
complexity in this area of law has arisen from the way in which courts have 
sought to work out the appropriate interplay between these and the strategies 
already immanent in the law. Absent a technology for disseminating registered 
information at low cost to third parties generally, registration complements, 
rather than substitutes for, the other strategies of property law. 
 
Implications of the Analysis 
Seeing corporate law in light of our theory generates a taxonomy that divides it 
into ‘proprietary foundations’ and a ‘contractarian superstructure’. Seeing the 
law in this way has several significant implications. As a matter of positive 
analysis, it points the way to overcoming some of the limitations of the purely 
contractarian theory of corporate law. The functions performed by the 
proprietary foundations of the subject could not be replicated by parties writing 
‘standard form’ contracts, thereby responding to the objection of triviality. To be 
sure, our account does not deny that much of corporate law—the aspects we 
term the ‘contractarian superstructure’—may usefully be analysed in 
contractarian terms. Nevertheless, it makes the positive claim that the successful 
operation of these rules depends upon the ability of property law to support the 
co-ownership arrangements that effect much of the internal governance of firms. 
On one level, our analysis can be seen as an attempt to re-emphasise the ‘law’ in 
corporate ‘law and economics’ scholarship.
156 That said, we do not advocate any 
reification of the notion of the corporate ‘entity’. 
 
This positive claim yields empirically testable hypotheses. If we are correct, 
then the development of the ‘proprietary foundation’ of corporate law should be 
a much more significant determinant of capital accumulation than the rules 
comprised in the ‘contractarian superstructure’. This could be tested both 
historically within a single jurisdiction and cross-sectionally over multiple 
jurisdictions. In particular, we would expect that (i) the efficacy of registration 
mechanisms; (ii) the availability of a general bona fide purchaser defence; and 
(iii) the effectiveness of insolvency law would be crucial for the development of 
corporate finance—more so than the introduction of the corporate entity 
principle itself. 
   28
Our account also has important normative implications. For those engaged in the 
reform of company law, the paper’s analysis should assist in identifying which 
areas of law will yield the greatest return on the investment of reform effort. 
Resources should be concentrated on the law’s proprietary foundation, since its 
impact is of disproportionate importance. Three specific implications are worth 
noting: (i) that reform of ‘company law’ should not be conducted in isolation 
from other areas of law that are important parts of the proprietary foundations of 
the subject, in particular secured credit and insolvency; (ii) that greater 
consistency could be achieved in the way in which the ‘fundamental trade-off’ is 
effected in relation to different aspects of corporate shared ownership; and (iii) 
the significance of information technology to the viability of the registration 
strategy.  
 
More generally, the analysis has implications for debates about the functions 
that company law should be understood as serving. Given that what we have 
termed the ‘proprietary foundations’ of corporate law cannot be replicated by 
private contract, it follows that no normative privilege should be accorded to 
private ordering in respect of this part of the subject.
157 This is so, even for 
accounts internal to law and economics scholarship: the optimality of the law’s 
existing solutions cannot be presumed simply from their persistence. It is quite 
possible that alterations in the way in which the proprietary foundations of 
corporate law effect the ‘essential trade-off’ could enhance efficiency. For 
example, it might be that introducing greater contractibility into aspects of the 
proprietary foundation that are currently governed by a numerus clausus 
strategy—such as insolvency law—might be a beneficial step.
158 It is also 
conceivable that the facilitation of the grant of proprietary rights to other, non-
creditor, stakeholder groups might also be welfare enhancing.
159 These are 
difficult questions, answers to which are beyond the scope of this article. Our 
current point is simply that it cannot be presumed because such solutions do not 
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